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Abstract	
This	study	addresses	the	nature	of	the	networks	which	researchers	use	to	access	
resources	focusing	on	the	nature	of	network‐mediated	resource	exchanges	and	the	
relationship	to	those	network	connection	strengths.		Innovation	literature	tends	to	
assume	 that	 for	 research	collaboration	weak	 ties	–	allowing	 loose	coupling	–	are	
optimal,	 and	 it	 is	 precisely	 that	 notion	 that	 we	 seek	 to	 test	 here.	 	 This	 paper	
addresses	 the	manner	 in	which	relational	and	 institutional	 traits	 interact	 in	R&D	
relationships,	 and	 specifically	 the	 institutional	 context	 and	 functional	
characteristics	 of	 a	 tie	 between	 two	 researchers.	 	We	use	Granovetter’s	network	
theory	 to	 conceptualise	 scientific	 network	 functioning	 in	 R&D	 collaborative	
relationships,	 classifying	 ties	 into	 strong	 and	 weak	 ties.	 We	 then	 analyse	 how	
actors’	 	 institutional	 contexts	 (and	 their	 similarity	 or	 difference)	 affect	 how	
researchers	 conduct	 resources	 exchanges.	 	 We	 argue	 ‘	 tie	 characteristics’	 can	
predict	 different	 patterns	 of	 exchange	 behaviours	 depending	 on	 partners’	
institutional	affiliations.	Our	findings	stress	that	institutional	affiliation	determines	
which	tie	characteristics	are	in	the	best	interest	for	the	access	to	resources	to	take	
place.	
	
Keywords:	university‐industry	interactions,	researcher	networks,	R&D	networks,	
R&D	collaboration,	tie	strength,	institutional	distance	
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1. Introduction	
One	of	 the	main	motivations	 for	academic	 researchers	 to	collaborate	 in	scientific	
networks	is	to	access	resources	to	their	research.	This	study	addresses	the	nature	
of	 the	 these	 researcher	 resource	 access	 networks,	 in	 particular	 focusing	 on	 the	
nature	 of	 network‐mediated	 resource	 exchanges	 and	 the	 relationship	 to	 those	
network	 connection	 strengths.	 	 Innovation	 literature	 tends	 to	 assume	 that	 for	
research	collaboration	weak	ties	–	allowing	loose	coupling	–	are	optimal,	and	it	is	
precisely	that	notion	that	we	seek	to	test	here.	
Scientific	fields	can	be	understood	as	an	endeavour	allocating	resources	efficiently;	
scientists	constantly	compete	and	position/	profile	 themselves	 to	best	access	 the	
resources	 needed	 for	 core	 scientific	 activities	 (financial,	 reputational,	 and	
knowledge).		However,	science	is	neither	a	purely	competitive	transactional	arena	
neither	 are	 science	 resources	 exchanged	 purely	 via	 top‐down	 hierarchical	 block	
grants.	 	 Science	 is	 inherently	 uncertain;	 scientists	 competing	 for	 resources	 are	
attempting	 to	 raise	 resources	 to	 attempt	 to	 do	 something	 (create	 new	 research	
results)	 and	can	offer	no	guarantees	 that	 they	will	 succeed.	 	Networks	provide	a	
means	to	bridge	between	pure	market	and	hierarchy	resource	allocation	models,	
and	scientists’	social	networks	have	a	ex	ante	signalling	function,	that	a	team	has	
the	 capacity	 that	means	 it	 has	 a	 good	 chance	 of	 using	 the	 resources	 to	 create	 a	
good	‘product’	(impactful	science).			
Thus,	 understanding	 science	 systems	 requires	 clearly	 understanding	 those	
networks’		significance.	Certainly,	European	policy‐makers	have	placed	increasing	
emphasis	 on	 encouraging	 scientific	 networks	 in	 the	 European	 Framework	
Programmes	and	Horizon2020.	The	first	consortia	emerged	in	the	mid‐1980s,	and	
their	 success	 laid	 the	 basis	 for	 making	 network‐building	 a	 central	 European	
science	policy	goal.		However,	sereval	issues	remain	unclear,	namely:	the	dynamics	
of	those	networks,	and	their	relationship	with	scientific	content,	and	the	resources	
exchanged	through	them.	
This	 paper	 addresses	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 relational	 and	 institutional	 traits	
interact	 in	 R&D	 relationships,	 and	 specifically	 the	 institutional	 context	 of	 a	 tie	
between	two	researchers,	and	the	characteristics	of	that	tie.		We	use	Granovetter’s	
network	 theory	 to	 conceptualise	 scientific	 network	 functioning	 in	 R&D	
collaborative	relationships,	classifying	ties	into	strong	and	weak	ties	according	to	
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four	 dimensions,	 namely	 —how	 long	 contacts	 have	 known	 each	 other,	 the	
emotional	intimacy	(or	friendship)	between	the	contacts,	the	degree	to	which	the	
contacts	 mutually	 trust	 and	 confide	 in	 each	 other,	 and	 the	 reciprocity	 in	 their	
relationship.	Using	this	definition	of	strength	we	firstly	characterize	the	one‐to‐one	
exchanges	 (dyadic	 relations).	 We	 then	 analyse	 how	 the	 institutional	 contexts	
within	which	 the	 two	contacts	are	 embedded	 (and	 their	 similarity	or	difference)	
affect	 the	 ways	 researchers	 conduct	 resources	 exchanges.	 	 We	 argue	 tie	
characteristics	 thus	 defined	 can	 predict	 different	 patterns	 exchange	 behaviours	
depending	 on	 partners’	 institutional	 affiliations.	 Our	 findings	 stress	 that	
institutional	affiliation	determines	which	tie	characteristics	are	in	the	best	interest	
for	the	access	to	resources	to	take	place.	
2. Tie	strength	and	academic	resource	exchange	
Scientific	 collaboration	 is	 an	 intrinsically	 social	 process,	 where	 individuals,	 not	
organizations,	are	the	key	actors	(Katz	&	Martin,	1997;	Oliver	&	Liebeskind,	1997;	
Powell,	 1990).	 The	 locus	 of	 control	 in	 scientific	 collaboration	 lies	 primarily	with	
individuals	 and	 only	 secondarily	 with	 the	 organizations	 with	 which	 they	 are	
affiliated,	particularly	when	academic	institutions	are	involved	(Bozeman	&	Corley,	
2004;	 Liebeskind,	 Oliver,	 Zucker,	 &	 Brewer,	 1996).	 Researchers’	 accumulated	
know‐how	 and	 information	 constitute	 personal	 knowledge	 stocks	 exploited	 for	
both	 personal	 and	 institutional	 advantage	 (McFadyen	 &	 Cannella	 Jr,	 2004);	
consequently,	 R&D	 collaborations	 takes	 place	 primarily	 in	 an	 interpersonal	 way	
(Oliver	&	Liebeskind,	1997).		In	contrast	to	other	collaborations,	actors	involved	in	
scientific	 collaboration	 are	 less	 guided	 by	 formal	 organisational	 structures	 of	
authority	 and	more	 dependent	 on	 individuals’	 relationships	 (Bozeman	&	 Corley,	
2004;	Powell,	1990;	Uzzi,	1996).	
The	 study	 of	 R&D	 networks	 has	 mostly	 been	 addressed	 using	 structural	 social	
network	 analysis	 approaches	 using	 formal	 mathematical	 methods	 to	 derive	
network	properties	including	centrality	and	density	(Cantner	&	Graf,	2006).		Such	
approaches	 conceptualise	 individuals’	 potential	 control	 and	 access	 to	 critical	
resources	are	in	terms	of	their	topological	positioning	within	these	networks	and	
regard	 network	 properties	 as	 being	 explicable	 in	 terms	 of	 network	 architecture	
(Ahuja	et	al.,	2003).	Less	attention	has	been	paid	to	R&D	network	analysis	from	a	
relational	perspective,	and	specifically	to	considering	not	just	the	structure	of	ties	
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but	 their	 qualities	 and	 the	 effects	 that	 this	 has	 upon	 real	 resources	 exchanges	
between	them.	
Structural	 approaches	 have	 demonstrated	 a	 versatile	 applicability	 for	 explaining	
how	 networks	 function	 in	 terms	 of	 inter‐actor	 distance	 but	 do	 not	 address	 the	
characteristics	of	actor	interconnections.	 	Relationships	are	not	merely	functional	
‘connections’	 by	 which	 actors	 identify	 potential	 future	 collaborators	 but	 also	
arenas	 for	 developing	 situated	 learning	 and	 knowledge	 upon	 which	 future	
collaborative	research	projects	can	be	built	(Caniëls	et	al.,	2014).	There	is	clearly	a	
relationship	 between	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 relationships	 (in	 terms	 of	 a	 shared	
knowledge	 base)	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 business	 transacted	 through	 these	
relationship	 (extending	 the	 knowledge	 base	 through	 research).	 	 Therefore,	 we	
argue	 there	 is	 a	 pressing	 need	 to	 focus	 on	 relationship	 quality,	 drawing	 upon	
Granovetter	(1973)’s	definition	of	tie	strength.	
3. Tie	strength	&	resources	access	via	collaborators	from	
diverse	institutional	contexts	
Granovetter	 argued	 that	 the	 strength	 of	 links	 within	 a	 network	 can	 explain	
resource	 access	 (Rowley	 et	 al.,	 2000):	 this	 is	 germane	 to	 address	 our	 specific	
research	 question,	 namely	 how	 does	 strength	 of	 ties	 between	 researchers	 affect	
the	nature	of	resource	exchanges	in	collaborative	research	activities.	Granovetter	
defined	 tie	 strength	 around	 four	 main	 characteristics:	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 for	
which	 the	 link	 has	 existed,	 the	 emotional	 intimacy	 (or	 friendship)	 in	 the	 link,	
mutual	 confidence	 (or	 trust)	 and	 reciprocity.	 These	 attributes	 help	 explain	 how	
two	 social	 actors	mutually	 interrelate	 –	 our	 question	 is	whether	 this	 affects	 the	
nature	of	the	resources	they	exchange.		We	are	not	the	first	to	apply	Granovetter’s	
framework	 to	 innovation	 and	 research	 networks,	 and	 with	 several	 authors	
reiterating	 the	 importance	 of	 tie	 strength	 as	 a	 determining	 characteristic	 of	
relationship	performance	(inter	alia	Rowley	et	al.,	2000;	Fromhold‐Esebith	et	al.,	
2014;	Caniëls	et	al.,	2014).	
Weak	ties	are	defined	as	casual	acquaintances	between	social	actors	(Brass,	et	al.,	
1998),	 involving	 infrequent	 interaction	 (Granovetter,	 1973)	 and	 lacking	
substantive	friendship,	 trust	or	reciprocity.	However,	weak	links	can	act	as	“local	
bridges”	 to	 other	 social	 circles	 beyond	 the	 individual’s	 immediate	 environment,	
helping	 the	 actor	 to	 discover	 new	 resources	 by	 connecting	 actors	 from	different	
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social	 circles	 (Granovetter,	 1973;	 McEvily,	 and	 Zaheer,	 1999).	 	 Weak	 ties	 in	
innovation	networks	can	facilitate	brokerage,	 linking,	bridging	of	structural	holes	
and	ultimately	strong	tie	formation	(Fritsch,	&	Kauffeld‐Monz,	2010).	
However,	other	types	of	resources	may	better	be	transmitted	by	strong	ties	(Uzzi,	
1997;	Hansen,	1999;	Rowley,	et	al.,	2000),	based	on	 trust,	 friendship,	 reciprocity	
and	 frequency	 of	 interaction	 (Krackhardt,	 1992;	 Uzzi,	 1997;	 Brass,	 et	 al.,	 1998;	
Reagans,	 and	 Zuckerman,	 2001).	 Strong	 ties	 exists	 when	 individuals	 acquire	
detailed	 knowledge	 about	 the	 other’s	 capabilities,	 attitudes,	 behaviours	 and	
objectives.	 	Trust	 facilitates	cooperation	among	social	actors	(Brass,	et	al.,	1998),	
favouring	 resources/	 information	 exchange	 (critical	 for	 scientific	 networks)	
(Krackhardt,	1992).	Interaction	frequency	provides	necessary	experience	to	allow	
participants	 to	 predict	 (a)	 which	 resources	 the	 other	 needs,	 and	 (b)	 how	 the	
shared	resources	would	be	utilized	by	the	partner	(Krackhardt,	1992;	Uzzi,	1997).	
As	 a	 result,	 these	 strong	 links	 provide	 in‐depth	 and	 specific	 knowledge	 in	 a	
particular	 area	 of	 interest	 for	 the	 individuals	 involved	 (Rowley,	 et	 al.,	 2000),	
thereby	contributing	to	knowledge	creation	and	dissemination	capabilities.		
Nevertheless,	 collaboration	 partners	 may	 face	 problems	 when	 transferring	
resources	 through	 social	 relations:	 actors	 may	 have	 divergent	 objectives	 and	
interests	 (Bouty,	 2000;	Wicks	&	Berman,	 2004),	 or	 exchange	may	 reveal	 trading	
imbalances	between	partners	(Bradach	&	Eccles,	1989).	These	difficulties	appear	
to	be	 significantly	 greater	 among	actors	 from	different	 institutional	 contexts;	 for	
instance,	 when	 they	 belong	 to	 different	 types	 of	 organizations	 (Powell,	 1990;	
Bouty,	 2000).	 	 When	 two	 individuals	 interact	 instrumentally,	 they	 have	 an	
interpersonal	 tie	but	 the	 interaction	 is	affected	by	their	other	group	(Brass	et	al.,	
2004)	 and	 institutional	 affiliations	 (Leydesdorff,	 2000).	 Individual	 tie	
characteristics	 cannot	 exclusively	 explain	 how	 actors	 access	 resources,	 by	
themselves	the	way	resources	are	accessed	by	actors:	there	is	a	need	to	consider	
the	role	of	context,	and	in	particular	of	institutional	affiliation	of	the	partners.	The	
majority	of	bridge	ties	between	two	different	institutional	collaborators	may	well	
start	as	weak	links,	yet	some	may	overcome	the	barriers	of	institutional	distance,	
becoming	strong.		
Individuals	 seeking	 out	 resources	 embedded	 within	 other	 institutional	
environments	have	a	greater	chance	of	accessing	 if	 they	can	develop	a	strong	 tie	
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with	 other	 amenable	 individuals.	 This	 in	 turn	 hinges	 on	 the	 degree	 of	 affinity	
between	the	two	actors	partly	related	to	the	compatibility	of	their	objectives,	and	
the	degree	to	which	each	approves	of	the	norms	of	the	other’s	institutional	context.	
This	affinity	is	more	difficult	and	costly	to	build	when	actors	are	dissimilar,	despite	
potentially	 high	 future	 benefits	 through	 accessing	 new	 resources	 in	 other	
institutional	environments	(Burt,	1992).		This	suggests	to	us	that	there	may	be	two	
salient	 relationships	 here,	 with	 (a)	 tie	 strength	 affecting	 the	 magnitude	 of	
resources	 exchanged,	 and	 (b)	 tie	 strength	 affect	 varies	 according	 to	 the	
institutional	 distance	 between	 partners.	 We	 therefore	 propose	 the	 following	
hypothesis:	
H1: Tie strength is positively related with the access to any type of resources 
independently of institutional distance between partners. 
4. Tie	characteristics	&		resources	access	via	collaborators	
from	diverse	contexts	
Tie	 characteristics	 are	 often	 reduced	 to	 a	 binary	 variable	 (strong	 or	 	 weak)	 to	
facilitate	representing	social	networks	 through	 their	 topological	architecture.	We	
argue	that	the	impact	of	tie	strength	on	the	reception	of	resources	might	however	
be	conditional	on	different	components	of	tie	strength	(Silverman	&	Baum,	2002).	
The	 correspondence	 between	 tie	 characteristic	 and	 strength	 depends	 is	 at	 least	
partly	 on	 the	 interacting	 agents’	 institutional	 contexts.	 	 Consequently,	 ties	 that	
have	 similar	 characteristics	 (e.g.	 frequency,	 length	 of	 contact,	 and	 friendship)	
might	 potentially	 have	 rather	 different	 strengths	 if	 between	 people	 in	 different	
organisational	 contexts:	 (Keefer	 &	 Knack,	 2005;	 Olk	 &	 Gibbons,	 2010;	 Zaheer	 &	
Zaheer,	 2006).	 Exchange	 behaviour	 depends	 on	 shared	 expectations,	 which	 are	
influenced	 by	 actors’	 different	 institutional	 environments	 (Zaheer	 and	 Zaheer,	
2006).	Therefore,	different	institutional	conditions	can	lead	individuals	to	different	
exchange	 expectations.	 If	 expectations	 shape	 behaviour,	 then	 a	 particular	 actor	
may	 place	 more	 weight	 on	 one	 or	 other	 relational	 characteristic	 depending	 on	
their	 partner’s	 institutional	 affiliation	 (something	 which	 (Dunn	 &	 Jones,	 2011)		
found	 true	 for	 professionals	 operating	 in	multiple	 institutional	 environments.	 If	
academics	 demonstrate	 such	 adaptive	 behaviours	 when	 operating	 in	 diverse	
institutional	 contexts	 then	 some	 tie	 characteristics	 may	 be	 more	 salient	 in	
accessing	resources	from	firms,	while	others	characteristics	may	be	more	salient	in	
exchanges	with	governmental	entities	or	universities.		
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Specifically,	 we	 argue	 this	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 resources	 exchange	 being	
contingent	 to	 the	 institutional	 distance	 between	 partners.	 	 Institutional	 distance	
we	 here	 define	 as	 the	 level	 of	 dissimilarity	 on	 each	 partner’s	 institutional	
frameworks,	 the	 dissimilar	 habits	 they	 exhibit,	 different	 cultural	 norms	 and	
traditions,	 as	 well	 as	 diverse	 formal	 incentive	 regimes	 (Boschma,	 2005).	
Institutional	 distance	 may	 impact	 upon	 actors’	 relational	 behaviours	 via	 two	
mechanisms:	
(1)	 Institutional	 distance	 affects	 the	 accuracy	 of	 expectations	 over	 the	 partners’	
behaviours	and	intentions:	more	distance	equals	less	accuracy.		
When	 actors	 do	 not	 share	 institutional	 framework,	 as	 possible	 in	 R&D	
collaborations	 between	 a	 firm	 and	 a	 university,	 there	 may	 be	 a	 difference	 of	
cultures,	 incentive	 system,	 objectives	 and	 even	 social	 and	 economic	 roles.	 	 It	 is	
widely	 noted	 that	 firms	 first	 priority	 around	 discovery	 in	 securing	 ownership	
rights	whilst	academics	seek	to	publish	and	disseminate	Bruneel	et	al.	2010.			
(2)	 Institutional	distance	 is	 inversely	 related	with	 the	 likelihood	of	 collaborators	
being	direct	competitors,	diminishing	the	risk	of	harmful	opportunistic	behaviour	
from	the	partner:	more	distance	equals	less	risk.	
Within	the	business	of	science,	partners	from	different	institutional	environments	
are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 direct	 competitors	 as	 they	 operate	 in	 different	 contexts	
(markets)	with	different	 roles	and	may	even	pursue	different	kinds	of	objectives	
(Powell,	 1990).	 Ties	 with	 potential	 competitors	 (that	 is	 with	 close	 institutional	
partners)	 carry	 with	 them	 a	 greater	 probability	 (or	 risk)	 of	 opportunistic	
behaviour	 (Silverman,	 and	 Baum,	 2002),	 exacerbated	 within	 research	
collaborations’	 technologically	 dynamic	 contexts	 with	 strong	 first	 move	
advantages	 (Powell,	 1990;	 Rowley,	 et	 al.,	 2000).	 Exchanging	 key	 resources	 with	
competitor‐collaborators	could	expose	actors	to	risk	and	vulnerability.	
Summarising,	two	forces	frame	R&D	collaborators’	resource	access:		
(1)	 difficulty	 generating	 accurate	 expectations	 over	 partners’	 behaviour	 and	
intentions,	and		
(2)	competitiveness	(rivalry)	and	risk	of	harmful	opportunistic	behaviour.		
We	 theorise	 that	 the	 dominant	 force	 framing	 resource	 exchange	 will	 differ	
depending	 upon	 partners’	 institutional	 distance.	 Academia‐firms	 relationship	
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(institutionally	distant	partners)	behaviour	primarily	face	the	former,	uncertainty	
over	 partner’s	 behaviours:	 successful	 resource	 exchange	 requires	 diminishing	
uncertainty	by	enhancing	 learning	about	partner’s	operating	way	and	 intentions.	
Conversely,	 collaborating	 academics	 face	 competitiveness	 and	 opportunism,	 and	
success	relies	on	developing	some	sort	of	control	mechanism	(formal	or	informal)	
discouraging	opportunistic	behaviour.		
To	 distinguish	 multiple	 exchange	 behaviours,	 we	 define	 tie	 characteristics	
following	 Granovetterian	 strength,	 and	 use	 Krackhardt’s	 (1992)	 notion	 of	
objectivity,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 particular	 tie	 attributes	 depend	 on	 partners’	
objective/	 subjective	 valuations.	 We	 here	 distinguish	 (1)	 objective	 (2)	 quasi‐
objective	 and	 (3)	 subjective	 characteristics,	 and	 argue	 that	 that	 not	 all	 tie	
strength’s	features	will	contribute	equally	to	collaborator	resource	access,	which	is	
contingent	upon	institutional	distance	between	partners.	
4.1	Institutional	distance,	objective	characteristics	of	a	tie	and	
resource	access	
Objective	tie	characteristics	are	easily	calculated	using	quantitative	measurements,	
they	are	not	affected	by	collaborators’	subjective	valuations,	and	are	consequently	
symmetrical.	Objective	 indicators	do	not	explicitly	 imply	social	norms	that	actors	
are	forced	to	follow.	This	is	exemplified	by	the	time	actors	invest	in	a	relationship,	
here	 distinguishing	 two	 time	 attributes:	 length	 and	 interaction	 frequency.	 The	
variable	relationship	length	is	calculated	as	the	time	elapsed	from	the	creation	of	
the	tie	to	its	dissolution	or	present	moment.	Interaction	frequency	is	defined	as	the	
time	dedicated	to	and/or	the	number	of	direct	contacts	between	two	actors	realize	
in	a	certain	time	period.		
These	 characteristics—length	 and	 frequency—are	 important	 features	 of	 social	
relationships;	 interaction	over	 time	allows	actors	 to	obtain	experience	necessary	
for	knowing	each	other’s	capabilities	and	behaviours	(Krackhardt,	1992,	Gulati	and	
Gargiulo,	 1999).	 	 Knowing	 each	 other	 for	 longer	 and	 contacting	more	 regulrarly	
allows	 partners	 to	 better	 predicty	 which	 unknown	 resources	 the	 partner	 may	
have,	 and	 how	 those	 resources	 could	 be	 combined	 with	 the	 actor’s	 resources	
within	 a	 relationship	 (Krackhardt,	 1992;	 Uzzi,	 1997).	 Time	 invested	 allows	
individuals	to	acquire	detailed	knowledge	about	the	other’s	capabilities,	attitudes,	
behaviors	 and	 objectives.	 Time	 dedicated	 to	 the	 relationship	 thus	 provides	 in‐
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depth	 and	 specific	 knowledge	 in	 a	 particular	 area	 of	 interest	 for	 the	 individuals	
involved	 (Rowley	 et	 al.,	 2000),	 thereby	 contributing	 to	 knowledge	 creation	 and	
dissemination	capabilities.		
Actors	 from	 different	 institutional	 contexts	 may	 face	 greater	 difficulties	 in	
achieving	such	understanding	about	their	partners	and	need	more	information	to	
achieve	 the	 same	 depth	 of	 understanding	 because	 of	 specific	 institutional	
particularities	 in	 each	 context.	 A	 tie’s	 time	 characteristics	 become	 crucial	 for	
reducing	 this	 institutional	 distance,	 promoting	 mutual	 understanding	 and	
enhancing	 the	 exchange	 of	 resources	 between	 partners.	 We	 would	 therefore	
expect	 to	 find	 that	 institutionally‐distant	 partners	 would	 invest	 more	 time	 in	
relationships	where	 there	were	 substantial	 resource	 exchanges.	 Accordingly,	 we	
expect	to	see	the	following	relationships:	
R1: the positive relationship between objective characteristics tie and resources 
access is greater in the case of institutionally distant partners, than more close 
ones. 
4.2	Institutional	distance,	quasi‐objective	characteristics	of	a	tie	and	
resource	access	
The	 quasi‐objective	 attributes	 of	 a	 tie	 are	 those	 which	 are	 based	 on	 a	 material	
phenomenon	 but	 also	 on	 how	 that	 is	 interpreted,	 and	 in	 this	 case	 we	 posit	
reciprocity,	an	exchange	pattern	of	mutual	benefits	between	two	actors	(Gouldner,	
1960).	Reciprocity	is	the	coequal	investment	and	result	perceived	by	each	member	
in	a	social	relationship,	related	to	individuals’	internal	standards	(Pritchard,	1969).	
Reciprocity	 is	 achieved	when	 the	 amount	 and	 value	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 given	
and	received	within	the	relationship	are	roughly	equivalent	and	are	perceived	as	
such	 by	 participants	 (Gouldner,	 1960;	Uhl	&	Maslyn	 2003;	Westphal	&	 Clement,	
2008).	 Reciprocity	 need	 not	 reflect	 a	 fairness	 norm	 but	 might	 also	 reflect	
individual	 self‐interest	 (Blau,	 1964;	 Homans,	 1950),	 seeking	 to	 increase	 the	
likelihood	of	 future	 favours	 (Westphal	&	Clement,	 2008).	 Reciprocity	 constitutes	
an	 equilibrated	 and	 efficient	 exchange	 behaviour	 as	 individuals	 intentionally	
receive	 what	 they	 give	 enhancing	 resources	 exchanges	 among	 social	 actors	
(Villanueva‐Felez	et	al.,	2014).	
Reciprocity	may	vary	along	two	dimensions,	namely,	intensity	and	symmetry,	both	
being	 quasi‐objective	 characteristics	 as	 relating	 perceptions	 (subjective)	 of	
received	benefits	(objective).		Relationship	intensity	is	the	strength	of	the	resource	
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exchange	 interactions	 mediated	 through	 the	 relationship,	 which.	 	 Reciprocity	
symmetry	is	the	degree	to	which	there	is	a	directionality	between	the	flow;	actors	
perceiving	 that	 they	 receive	 as	much	 as	 they	 give	 is	 a	 symmetrical	 relationship.		
Conversely,	if	actors	believe	that	they	receive	or	give	far	more	than	vice	versa	it	is	a	
highly	asymmetric	relationship.		
Reciprocal	resource	exchange	is	more	difficult	to	achieve	when	partners	belong	to	
different	 institutional	 contexts.	 The	 relative	 value	 of	 resources	may	 likely	 differ	
between	institutional	spheres,	with	partners	in	distinct	institutional	environments	
finding	it	more	difficult	to	agree	on	the	value	of	the	resources	given	and	received.	
Partners	 from	 similar	 institutional	 spheres	 face	 comparable	 conditions,	 and	 are	
therefore	 more	 likely	 to	 reach	 equivalent	 assessments	 of	 resource	 value	 within	
their	 exchanges.	We	 likewise	believe	 that	 reciprocity	does	not	 impose	any	 social	
norm	or	governance	mechanism	within	the	relationship	to	significantly	reduce	risk	
of	opportunistic	behaviour	from	competitors.		
Both	intensity	and	symmetry	will	be	important	for	averagely	institutionally	distant	
partners,	 constituting	 an	 efficient	 way	 to	 conduct	 resources	 exchange	 when	
institutional	 differences	 do	 not	 obstructing	 collaborations	 but	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	
direct	 mutual	 knowledge	 of	 institutional	 context.	 Hence	 we	 expect	 to	 find	 the	
following	relationship	
R2: the positive relationship between quasi-objective characteristics and resources 
access is greatest in the case of partners with an average institutional distance, 
than more distant or closer ones. 
 
4.3	Institutional	distance,	subjective	characteristics	of	a	tie	and	
resource	access	
Subjective	 tie	 attributes	 correspond	 with	 more	 qualitative	 features	 in	
Granovetter’s	definition—i.e.,	friendship	and	trust—	and	as	inherently	interpretive	
aspects	 rely	 on	 individuals’	 psychological	 states,	making	 them	 hard	 to	measure.	
Friendship	entails	 emotional	 involvement	with	 another,	 and	hence	 interpersonal	
attachment	 and	 identification	 (Blau,	 1964;	 Parsons,	 1915).	 Friendship	 implies	
commitment,	 with	 individuals	 making	 periodic	 contributions	 to	 a	 relationship	
without	 expecting	 immediate	 reciprocal	 benefits.	 Parties’	 mutual	 affection	 and	
explicit	 interest	 in	 maintaining	 the	 relationship	 provide	 sufficient	 incentives	 to	
facilitate	mutual	benefits	(Blau,	1964).	An	important	consequence	of	friendship	is	
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precisely	this	sense	of	duty	arising	among	individuals	and	intrinsic	motivations	for	
being	 helpful	 (Blau,	 1964;	 Granovetter,	 1983)	 with	 friends	 not	 shirking	 mutual	
social	 obligations	 (Parsons,	 1915).	 Friends	 are	 bound	 by	 “norms	 of	 loyalty”	
diminishing	 risk	 of	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 and	 promoting	 resources	 exchange.	
However,	it	may	promote	unequal	and	inefficient	exchanges	(Bicchieri	&	Muldoon,	
2011;	Clark,	1981;	Törnblom	&	Fredholm,	1984),	and	a	costly	R&D	collaboration	
governance	mechanism.	
Trust,	 although	 highly	 correlated	 with	 friendship,	 is	 defined	 as	 “a	 psychological	
state	 comprising	 the	 intention	 to	 accept	 vulnerability	 based	 upon	 positive	
expectation	of	the	intentions	or	behaviour	of	another	(Rousseau	et	al.	1998:	395)”.	
It	carries	both	the	perceived	likelihood	that	implicit	or	explicit	agreements	will	not	
be	 infringed	 upon	 (Madhok,	 1995),	 and	 a	 belief	 that	 an	 exchange	 partner’s	
behaviour	 is	 not	 exclusively	 self‐interested	 (Uzzi,	 1997).	 Additionally,	 trust	
increases	flexibility	and	tolerance	among	actors,	making	it	especially	important	in	
situations	where	ambiguity	 is	present	and	actors	contribute	 their	own	resources	
for	mutual	benefit	(Madhok,	1995).	
Subjective	tie	characteristics‐‐‐friendship	and	trust‐‐‐facilitate	cooperation	among	
social	actors	(Brass	et	al.,	1998),	as	well	as	resources	and	 information	exchanges		
(Krackhardt,	 1992),	 even	 between	 actors	 from	 dissimilar	 institutional	
environments.	 Friendship	 and	 trust	 are	 likewise	 related	 to	 behavioral	 patterns,	
and	 are	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 informal	 governance	
mechanisms	 in	 relationships	 (Aulakh	 et	 al.	 1996).	 Under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 these	
relational	 elements,	 actors	 may	 forgo	 explicit	 contractual	 arrangements,	 even	 if	
this	 increases	 their	exposure	 to	risk	 (Macaulay,	1963).	Consequently,	 reliance	on	
friendship	and	trust	becomes	a	significant	modus	operandi	in	exchanges	carrying	
substantial	risk	and	vulnerability	(Coleman,	1990).		
Nevertheless,	 building	 friendship	 and	 trust	 is	 not	 without	 cost	 (Madhok,	 1995;	
Zaheer	 &	 Zaheer,	 2006),	 involving	 significant	 investment	 of	 resources	 for	 both	
participants	 in	 the	 relationship,	 including	 time	 and	 monetary	 assets	 (Madhok,	
1995).	Wicks	and	Berman	(2004)	hold	that	such	a	costly	governance	mechanisms	
is	 employed	 only	 when	 it	 is	 essential:	 situations	 with	 considerable	 degrees	 of	
uncertainty,	vulnerability	and	 interdependency	(Madhok,	1995;	Zaheer	&	Zaheer,	
2006).		Ties	with	potential	competitors	are	more	difficult	to	manage	because	of	the	
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greater	 probability	 (or	 risk)	 to	 behave	 opportunistically	 (Silverman,	 and	 Baum,	
2002),	 particularly	 in	 academic	 research	 collaboration	 with	 strong	 first	 mover	
advantages,	 	 and	 the	 substantial	 disbenefits	 of	 being	 beaten	 to	 discovery	 by	 an	
opportunistic	collaborator		(Powell,	1990;	Rowley,	et	al.,	2000).		
As	said	before,	it	is	unlikely	that	partners	from	different	institutional	spheres	will	
be	direct	competitors	as	 they	usually	operate	 in	different	contexts	and	may	even	
have	 different	 kinds	 of	 objectives	 (Powell,	 1990).	 Therefore,	 when	 the	 contact	
comes	 from	 another	 institutional	 context,	 subjective	 characteristics	 may	 not	 be	
such	 a	 strong	 requirement	 to	 access	 resources	 (lower	 risk	 is	 present),	 whilst	
potential	 competitors	 conventionally	 come	 from	 the	 same	 institutional	 context.		
Therefore,	we	can	propose	the	following	relationship:	
R3: the positive relationship between subjective characteristics and resources 
access is greater in the case of institutionally similar partners, than more distant 
ones. 
 
We	use	our	three	expected	relationships	as	a	means	for	testing	our	hypothesis	H2	
and	combine	them	into	a	single	table	below.	
  Institutional distance 
  Close   Distant 
R1: Objective  Interaction Frequency Years in contact     + + 
R2: Quasi-objective 
Reciprocity Intensity 
Reciprocity Symmetry  + +  
R3: Subjective 
Friendship  
Trust + +   
 
H2: As institutional distance increases between R&D collaborators, academic 
scientists will tend to rely more on objective tie characteristic to access resources 
from their collaborators 
5. Methods	
5.1 Sample 
Testing	 the	 hypotheses	 presented	 in	 the	 preceding	 section	 required	 a	 context	
where	we	could	identify	individuals	scientists	who:	(1)	depend	on	their	access	to	
resources	 to	 carry	 out	 their	 work	 and	 enhance	 their	 academic	 carriers,	 and	 (2)	
usually	 interact	 professionally	 with	 other	 actors	 from	 the	 same	 and	 other	
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institutional	context.	For	these	reasons,	we	selected	the	field	of	academic	research	
in	nanotechnology.	Nano‐researchers	focus	on	the	development	of	technologies	at	
the	 nano‐scale	 (i.e.	 in	 the	 length	 of	 approximately	 1–100	 nm	 range);	 they	 thus	
require	 costly	 equipment	 such	 as	 clean	 rooms,	 extremely	 high‐powered	
microscopes,	 powerful	 lasers,	 etc.,	 that	 have	 to	 be	 obtained	 and	 operated	 in	
collaboration	 with	 other	 researchers	 in	 academia,	 industry	 or	 government	
laboratories.	Moreover,	 nanotechnology	 is	 an	 area	 of	 research	where	 traditional	
disciplines	 merge	 —material	 science,	 molecular	 biology,	 chemistry	 and	 physics	
(Stix,	 2001)—	 and	 where	 collaboration	 with	 other	 researchers	 has	 become	
essential	(Islam	&	Miyazaki,	2009;	Palmberg,	Dernis,	&	Miguet,	2009)		
Nevertheless,	 nanotechnology	 is	 a	 very	 broad	 and	 inclusive	 term	 with	 vague	
boundaries	(Meyer,	Morlacchi,	Persson,	Archambault,	&	Malsch,	2004).	Research	in	
this	 field	 includes	 areas	 as	 diverse	 as	medical	 applications,	 electronics,	 robotics,	
metrology,	 instrumentation,	 environment,	 etc.	 These	 areas	 of	 knowledge	 do	 not	
necessarily	 share	 a	 direct	 link,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 there	 is	 considerable	 cognitive	
distance	 between	 some	 of	 them	 (Meyer	 &	 Libaers,	 2008),	 resulting	 in	 differing	
resource	requirements	and	ways	of	collaborating	with	other	actors.		
To	deal	with	such	heterogeneity	and	obtain	a	controlled	and	homogeneous	sample,	
we	 limited	 this	 study	 to	 the	 relationships	maintained	 by	 scientists	working	 in	 a	
specific,	more	homogeneous,	 sub‐field:	 advanced	materials	 at	 the	nanoscale.	 The	
sample	 for	 this	 study	 included	 academics	 at	 state‐funded	 research	 centers.	 We	
selected	 11	 research	 centers	 that	 had	 explicitly	 stated	 (via	 public	 reports	 or	 on	
their	 web	 site)	 that	 nano‐materials	 represented	 their	 primary	 research	 activity;	
and	 had	 published	 through	 their	 website	 their	 researchers’	 names	 and	 e‐mail	
address.	We	identified	866	individuals	using	this	procedure.		
5.2 Data Collection 
We	 conducted	 a	 web	 survey	 among	 these	 nano‐materials	 researchers.	 We	 had	
previously	 piloted	 a	 preliminary	 Spanish	 and	 English	 version	 of	 the	 survey	
instrument	with	 10	 experts	 on	 studies	 of	 innovation.	 The	 second	 version	 of	 the	
questionnaire	was	tested	in	March	2008	with	6	nanotechnology	researchers	from	
Spain	 (for	 the	 Spanish	 version)	 and	 other	 European	 countries	 (for	 the	 English	
version)	 who	were	 not	 included	 in	 our	 sample.	 This	 second	 version	 underwent	
extensive	 qualitative	 pretesting	 that	 involved	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 the	 6	
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researchers.	 Each	 interview	 was	 approximately	 30	 minutes	 in	 length.	 We	 used	
feedback	from	the	interviews	to	refine	the	wording	of	the	questions,	the	scales	of	
the	answers	and	the	overall	presentation	of	the	survey1.	The	survey	was	designed	
and	tested	in	both	Spanish	and	English	to	address	those	researchers	whose	mother	
tongue	was	not	Spanish.	
The	 survey	was	 launched	 in	April	2008.	We	also	 followed	a	variety	of	actions	 to	
elicit	a	higher	response	rate:	a	multiple	contact	strategy	(prenotice	e‐mail	message,	
e‐mail	with	questionnaire,	 follow‐ups	and	reminders),	and	 the	personalization	of	
all	e‐mails	and	questionnaires	(Dillman,	2007).	We	received	213	responses,	which	
constituted	a	25%	response	rate.	From	this	group,	we	excluded	incomplete	cases	
and	 those	 respondents	 who	 did	 not	 report	 at	 least	 one	 tie	 with	 an	 external	
organization2.	 To	 reduce	 the	 probability	 of	 errors	 arising	 from	 the	 inclusion	 of	
researchers	 working	 in	 other	 nanotechnology	 sub‐areas,	 we	 incorporated	 two	
qualifying	questions	to	confirm	that	respondents	were	working	on	nano‐materials.		
Following	 these	 filtering	 stages,	 the	 final	 data	 set	 was	 comprised	 of	 161	
individuals:	 33	 full	 professors	 (20.5%),	 79	 associated	 scientists	 (49.1%)	 and	 49	
post‐doctoral	 researchers	 and	 doctoral	 students	 (30.4%).	 These	 respondents	
reported	 a	 total	 of	 594	 ties	 with	 firms,	 governmental	 organizations	 and	
universities.	Table	1	summarizes	the	relationships	reported,	by	group.	
	 	
                                                            
 
1 See Annex A for the final version of the survey. 
2 In order to increase the probability of reported contacts from other institutional spheres, we explicitly 
asked to exclude contacts from their own organization.  
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TABLE 1: Final Sample  
 
Full Professors Associated scientists PostDocs/Docs TOTAL 
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual 
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual 
n. % 
Nr of ties 
per 
individual
Firm 36 23.7 1.09 67 22.8 0.85 25 16.9 0.51 128 21.5 0.80 
Governmental 
organization 38 25.0 1.15 87 29.6 1.10 50 33.8 1.02 175 29.5 1.09 
University 78 51.3 2.36 140 51.3 1.77 73 49.3 1.49 291 49.0 1.81 
TOTAL 152 100 4.61 294 100 3.72 148 100 3.02 594 100 3.69 
5.3 Unit of Analysis and Measures 
5.3.1	 Unit	of	analysis	
The	 unit	 of	 analysis	 is	 the	 interpersonal	 relationship	 between	 a	 researcher	 and	
his/her	 main	 contact	 at	 those	 external	 and	 institutionally	 diverse	 organizations	
(firms,	 governmental	 entities	 and	 universities)	 collaborating	 with	 the	 scientist.	
Thus,	 all	 the	 relations	 analysed	 are	 manifestly	 positive	 and	 instrumental.	 The	
relevance	 of	 this	 unit	 of	 analysis,	 interpersonal	 relationship,	 is	 well	 justified	
throughout	the	literature.	Scholars	have	found	that	the	locus	of	control	in	scientific	
collaboration	 lies	 more	 on	 individuals	 than	 the	 organizations	 they	 represent,	
particularly	 when	 academic	 institutions	 are	 involved	 (Bozeman	 &	 Corley,	 2004;	
Liebeskind,	Oliver,	Zucker,	&	Brewer,	1996).	The	know‐how	and	information	that	
researchers	 accumulate	 over	 time	 constitute	 their	 own	 knowledge	 stocks	
(McFadyen	 &	 Cannella	 Jr,	 2004);	 consequently,	 the	 exchange	 within	 R&D	
collaboration	 takes	 place	 primarily	 between	 people	 and	 within	 the	 context	 of	
personal	 relationships	 (Oliver	 &	 Liebeskind,	 1997).	 Therefore,	 scientific	
collaboration	is	intrinsically	a	social	process,	where	individuals,	not	organizations,	
are	the	key	actors	(Katz	&	Martin,	1997;	Oliver	&	Liebeskind,	1997;	Powell,	1990).	
This	implies	a	complex,	and	dynamic	interaction	between	the	actors	involved,	less	
guided	by	formal	structures	of	authority	and	more	dependent	on	the	relationship	
among	individuals	(Bozeman	&	Corley,	2004;	Powell,	1990;	Uzzi,	1996).	
5.3.2	 Dependent variables 
We	 selected	 two	 types	 of	 resources	 as	 dependent	 variables:	 reputation—as	
intangible—and	 funding	 and	 tangible	 assets—as	 tangible—.	 Analysing	 the	
acquisition	of	 such	different	resources	 from	three	different	 institutional	partners	
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(firms,	governmental	entities	and	universities)	facilitates	the	discovery	of	specific	
exchange	modes	with	enough	reliability	and	validity.		
‐	Reputation	represents	both	an	individual	and	collective’s	perceptions	and	beliefs	
about	 a	 particular	 actor	 (Hall,	 1992;	 1993).	 Such	 perceptions	 reflex	 a	 complex	
combination	 of	 the	 characteristics	 and	major	 personal	 achievements,	 behaviours	
and	intentions	shown	during	a	period	of	time	that	have	been	directly	observed	by	
these	third	parties	and/or	known	through	secondary	sources	(Zinko,	2007).	These	
perceptions	are	built	according	to	a	set	of	values	and	expectations	(Emler,	1990)	
and	 are	 based	 on	 the	 information	 possessed	 about	 the	 individual’s	 past	 actions	
(Knoke,	1983;	Weigelt	y	Camerer,	1988).	
Reputation	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	 contexts	 characterized	 by	 imperfect	
information,	where	actors	must	 trust	on	estimations	 to	make	assumptions	about	
other	 actors’	 future	 intentions	 and	 behaviours	 (Weigelt	 et	 al.,	 1988;	 Fombrun	 y	
Shanley,	1990).	These	estimations	 come	 from	past	 interactions	and	observations	
and	 serve	 as	 a	 stable	 base	 from	where	 to	 form	 opinions	 about	 actors	 and	 their	
possible	 behaviors	 (Weigelt	 et	 al.,	 1988;	 Delmestri,	 Montanari	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 The	
acquisition	of	reputation	is	particularly	important	for	individual	actors,	because	as	
their	 reputation	 increases,	 actors	 become	 more	 valuable	 within	 different	 social	
scenarios	(Delmestri	et	al.,	2005),	even	promoting	the	emergence	of	new	relations	
among	agents.	
‐	 Funding	 and	 other	 tangible	 assets	 include	 access	 to	 funding,	 facilities	 and	
equipment	 to	 conduct	 research.	 Within	 highly	 dynamic,	 technological	 and	
competitive	fields	as	is	the	case	of	nano‐materials,	the	access	to	such	a	key	tangible	
resources	maybe	 crucial	 for	 researchers	 as	 favors	 them	 to	 adapt	 their	 research	
lines	to	the	new	changes	in	their	environment	(Powell,	1990;	Hansen,	1999;	Cross	
et	al.,	2004;	McFadyen	y	Cannella	Jr,	2005).	
We	 developed	 and	 refined	 the	 scales	 of	 both	 variables	 using	 feedback	 from	 the	
pretest	 interviews.	 Initially,	 a	 five‐point	 Likert‐type	 response	 format	 (from	
completely	 agree	 to	 completely	 disagree)	 was	 employed	 to	 define	 the	 scales	 of	
both	variables.	The	 final	version	 included	4‐point	agree‐disagree	scales,	with	 the	
middle	term	removed.		
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5.3.3	 Independent variables 
The	independent	variables	addressed	the	objective,	quasi‐objective	and	subjective	
characteristics	 of	 the	 personal	 ties	 contained	 in	 Granovetter’s	 tie	 strength	
definition		
Tie strength’s objective indicators 
The	amount	of	time:	interaction	frequency	and	years	in	contact.	The	first	indicates	
the	 frequency	of	 contact	between	 the	 researcher	and	his	 contact.	 It	 is	 an	ordinal	
variable	 with	 five	 categories	 ranging	 from	 weekly	 to	 yearly.	 Years	 in	 contact	
addresses	the	life	span	of	the	relationship.	It	is	an	ordinal	variable	containing	five	
time	ranges.	
Tie strength’s quasi-objective indicators 
The	level	of	reciprocity	was	constructed	similar	to	Friendkin	(1980).		The	base	for	
this	was	that	two	items:	whether	the	researcher	asked	the	main	contact	person	for	
personal	 and	 professional	 advice	 (item	 1)	 and,	 conversely,	 whether	 the	 contact	
person	asked	the	researcher	 for	advice	(item	2).	The	 intensity	of	reciprocity	was	
calculated	as	the	average	of	these	two	items:	this	measurement	underlines	to	what	
extent	 both	 individuals	 are	 proactive	 and	 their	 role	 in	 the	 relationship	 as	 both	
advice‐seekers	and	advice‐provider.	 	The	symmetry	of	reciprocity	was	calculated	
by	 firstly	 using	 the	 negative	 modulus	 of	 item	 1	 subtracted	 from	 item	 2;	 this	
variable	 (which	 varied	 from	 ‐4	 to	 0)	 was	 then	 normalised	 from	 ‐0.67	 to	 0;	 this	
normalisation	diminishes	the	asymmetry	involved	in	highly	intensity	relationships.	
Tie	strength’s	subjective	indicators	
The	 degree	 of	 friendship	 reflects	 the	 emotional	 intensity	 of	 a	 relationship	
(Gibbons,	2004).	We	considered	that	a	friend	is	an	individual	who	the	respondent	
identifies	 as	 such.	We	 asked	 respondents	 to	 indicate	 to	what	 extent	 they	 agreed	
with	 the	 following	 statement:	 “I	 consider	 this	 person	 my	 friend”	 (where	 “this	
person”	refers	to	the	respondent’s	main	contact	person	at	the	other	organization).		
The	degree	of	trust	refers	to	the	mutual	confiding	aspect.	We	asked	respondents	to	
specify	to	what	extent	they	considered	his/her	main	contact	person	trustworthy.		
The	 scales	 of	 all	 the	 items	 contained	 in	 these	 three	 variables	 used	 to	 measure	
friendship,	 trust	 and	 reciprocity	 were	 set	 to	 the	 five‐point	 Likert‐type	 (from	
completely	agree	to	completely	disagree).	
Tie strength 
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An	additional	measurement	was	generated	of	tie	strength,	which	combines	lineally	
each	of	 the	 five	 indicators	(communication	 frequency,	years	 in	contact,	degree	of	
friendship,	 degree	 of	 trust,	 and	 reciprocity)	 with	 equal	 weight,	 as	 suggested	 by	
Granovetter	(1973).	Each	of	these	is	ranked	on	a	five	pointscale.	
5.3.4	 Control variables 
We	 controlled	 for	 aspects	 that	 recurrently	 appear	 in	 the	 literature	of	 innovation	
studies	and	university‐society	relationship.	First,	the	models	included	attributes	of	
the	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 relationship.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 respondents’	 academic	
rank	 and	 type	 of	 research	were	 addressed	with	 two	dummy	variables.	 The	 first,	
distinguishes	 between	 full	 professors,	 associate	 scientists	 and	 post‐
doctoral/doctoral	 researchers.	 The	 second	 classifies	 academics	 according	 to	 the	
type	of	research	they	conduct:	pure	fundamental,	pure	applied	and	a	combination	
of	 fundamental	 and	 applied	 research.	 We	 also	 controlled	 for	 the	 contacts’	
geographical	 location	through	another	dummy	variable	which	distinguishes	if	the	
contacts	 are	 regional,	 national	 or	 international.	 Finally,	 we	 controlled	 for	 the	
formal	 collaborative	 activities	 the	 researchers	 carried	 out	 with	 their	 contact	
organizations.	 Thus,	 three	 dichotomous	 variables	 were	 created	 to	 check	 if	 both	
actors	 were	 collaborating	 through	 1)	 joint	 research	 or	 contract	 research	
agreements,	 2)	 publications	 or	 3)	 other	 activities	 (consultancy	 agreements,	
creation	of	new	facilities/spin‐offs	and	training)	
5.4 Analysis Techniques 
Non‐parametrical	 statistical	 techniques	 were	 used	 to	 analyse	 our	 data:	 Mann–
Whitney	U‐tests,	ordered	logistic	regressions,	and	bootstrapping.		
Mann–Whitney	U‐tests	were	used	to	enrich	the	descriptive	by	examining	partners’	
institutional	 differences	 in	 the	 strength	 of	 ties	 and	 resources	 access	 between	
respondents	and	their	collaborators	(Table	2).		
We	 employed	 ordered	 logit	 regressions	 (Table	 4)	 to	 determine	 the	 relationship	
between	 resources	 access	 and	 tie	 strength	 characteristics,	 using	 Huber‐White	
sandwich	 robust	 estimators	 to	 estimate	 standard	 errors.	 These	 estimators	 are	
considered	robust	because	they	provide	correct	standard	errors	in	the	presence	of	
violations	(e.g.	heteroscedasticity)	of	the	assumptions	of	the	model	(Long	&	Freese,	
2001).	 Moreover,	 working	 with	 dyadic	 data	 can	 imply	 a	 violation	 of	 the	
assumption	 that	 the	observations	are	 independent.	 Since	a	 single	 researcher	 can	
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have	relationships	with	different	partners,	our	respondents	were	allowed	to	report	
multiple	 relationships.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 error	 terms	 in	 the	 regression	 could	 be	
affected,	 given	 that	 they	 can	 be	 correlated	 across	 observations	 from	 the	 same	
source.	To	account	for	this,	we	used	a	cluster	option	in	the	estimation	to	indicate	
that	 the	 observations	 (relationships)	 were	 clustered	 into	 individuals.	 Therefore,	
the	 ties	 reported	 were	 possibly	 correlated	 within	 the	 responses	 given	 by	 one	
particular	individual,	but	would	remain	independent	between	the	161	researchers.	
The	robust	cluster	 technique	affects	 the	estimated	standard	errors	and	variance‐
covariance	 matrix	 of	 the	 estimators,	 but	 not	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 (Long	 &	
Freese,	2001).		
Finally,	 we	 used	 the	 non‐parametric	 bootstrapping	 procedure	 to	 compare	
differences	 in	 the	 estimated	 tie	 characteristics	 coefficients	 obtained	 from	 the	
ordered	 regressions	 (Angrist	 and	Pischke,	 2009).	 The	 resulting	bootstrapping	p‐
values	allow	us	to	compare	estimated	coefficients	from	regression	models	of	two	
different	 populations.	 Via	 this	 technic	 we	 able	 to	 check	 whether	 the	 same	 tie	
characteristics	 that	 explain	 resources	 access	 with	 different	 institutional	 agents	
result	 in	 significantly	 different	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 incremental	 access	 to	
resources	(Table	6).	
6. Results	
The	 splitting	 of	 the	 sample	 according	 to	 the	 contacts’	 institutional	 affiliation	 is	
shown	 in	 Table	 2.	 Researchers’	 respective	 relationships	 with	 agents	 from	 three	
different	 institutional	 spheres	 (university‐industry‐government)	are	 represented,	
with	 a	 total	 of	 291	 ties	with	 universities,	 128	 ties	with	 firms	 and	 175	 ties	with	
governmental	 agencies.	 This	 table	 also	 presents	 the	 mean	 of	 (1)	 access	 to	
reputation	and	funding,	(2)	tie	strength	and,	(3)	tie	characteristics	for	each	group	
of	 relationships.	 Non‐parametric	 tests	 (U	Mann‐Whitney)	were	 applied	 to	 check	
whether	the	values	of	these	elements	differ	significantly	among	these	three	groups.	
TABLE 2: Mean Differences of Resources Access and Tie Characteristics– U Mann‐Whitney test  
 Universities Sig. Firms Sig. Government Entities Sig. Universities 
Funding / Other tangible 
assets Access 2.51 ** 2.70 n.s. 2.63 n.s. 2.51 
Reputation Access 2.71 ** 2.53 † 2.67 n.s. 2.71 
TIE STRENGTH 17.73 ** 15.43 ** 17.23 n.s 17.73 
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Interaction Frequency 2.82 n.s. 2.73 n.s. 2.83 n.s. 2.82 
Years in contact 3.77 ** 3.10 ** 3.53 * 3.77 
Reciprocity Intensity 3.43 ** 2.95 ** 3.40 n.s. 3.43 
Reciprocity Symmetry  -0.05 ** -0.10 † -0.06 n.s. -0.05 
Friendship 3.59 ** 2.94 ** 3.46 n.s. 3.59 
Trust 4.11 ** 3.72 ** 4.01 n.s. 4.11 
N 291  128  175  291 
**p< 0.01. *p< 0.05. †p< 0.1 
We	assumed	three	different	 institutional	spheres	and	three	 levels	of	 institutional	
proximity	 between	 the	 researchers	 and	 their	 contacts.	 The	 closest	 institutional	
actors	 would	 be	 members	 from	 universities,	 followed	 by	 those	 working	 at	
governmental	agencies.	The	greatest	 institutional	distance	would	thus	occur	with	
the	contacts	from	firms3.		
According	to	Boschma	(2005),	 institutional	proximity	 is	strongly	related	to	social	
proximity,	which	is	commonly	measured	by	the	tie	strength	between	actors.	Under	
this	assumption,	we	expect	that	all	tie	strength	components	shown	in	Table	3	are	
significantly	lower	in	the	group	of	relationships	with	firms	than	in	the	rest.	We	also	
anticipate	 that	 these	 values	 are	 significantly	 greater	 in	 the	 ties	with	 universities	
than	 in	 the	 ties	 with	 governmental	 agencies.	 Moreover,	 we	 expect	 a	 positive	
correspondence	 between	 the	 total	 relationships	 reported	within	 each	 group	 and	
the	 institutional	 proximity,	 given	 that	 interaction	 tends	 to	 occur	 in	 a	 greater	
proportion	 among	 socially	 close	 actors	 (Homans,	 1950).	 The	 results	 shown	 in	
Table	 3	 allow	 us	 to	 affirm	 that	 three	 institutional	 distances	 do	 truly	 exist:	 the	
largest	 group	 of	 relationships	 corresponds	 to	 those	maintained	with	 university‐
members	 (i.e.	 closer	 institutional	 actors),	 and	 tie	 characteristics	 values	 are	
significantly	 lower	 with	 firm‐members	 (i.e.	 more	 distant	 institutional	 actors).	
Moreover,	 we	 can	 state	 that	 universities	 and	 governmental	 agencies	 are	
institutionally	closer	than	governmental	agencies	and	firms.	While	the	values	of	tie	
characteristics	 between	 governmental	 agencies	 and	 firms	 are	 significantly	
different,	 those	 found	 between	 governmental	 agencies	 and	 universities	 are	 not.	
                                                            
 
3 We initially assumed that the respondents belonged to the institutional sphere represented by 
universities. The targeted centers are (1) university research institutes; (2) joint research centers of the 
Spanish Research Council (CSIC) and public universities; and (3) CSIC research institutes. Clearly, the 
researchers from these centers develop professionally mainly under the institutions that apply to 
universities. Even so, most of them are also directly affected by institutions from the governmental 
sphere: CSIC is under the Secretary of State for Research, an arm of the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation.  
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Only	 the	 variable	 referring	 to	 the	 years	 in	 contact	 is	 significantly	 greater	 in	 the	
relationships	with	universities.	
Table	 2	 also	 reveals	 that	 access	 to	 funding	 and	 tangible	 assets	 is	 provided	 in	 a	
greater	 extent	 by	 firms	while	 reputation	 is	 acquired	 through	 collaborators	 from	
universities.		
Table	 3	 displays	 frequency	 descriptive	 statistics	 of	 geographical	 location	 of	
researchers	 contacts,	 collaboration	 activities	 conducted	 in	 cooperation	 and	
frequencies	of	the	dependent	variables—access	to	reputation	and	to	funding.	
TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Categories Universities Governmental entities Firms n. % n. % n % 
Geographical Regional 57 19.6 53 30.3 42 32.8 
Location  National 74 25.4 49 28.0 40 31.3 
 International 160 55.0 73 41.7 46 35.9 
Collaboration  Research projects 251 86.3 145 82.9 118 92.2 
activities Publications 209 71.8 108 61.7 28 21.9 
 Other 90 30.9 51 29.1 39 30.5 
Funding /  Completely disagree 63 21.6 26 14.9 21 16.4 
Other tangible  Disagree 57 19.6 39 22.3 15 11.7 
assets Agree 131 45.0 83 47.4 73 57.0 
 Completely agree 40 13.7 27 15.4 19 14.8 
Reputation Completely disagree 17 5.8 12 6.9 11 8.6 
 Disagree 90 30.9 56 32.0 53 41.4 
 Agree 143 49.1 85 48.6 49 38.3 
 Completely agree 41 14.1 22 12.6 15 11.7 
TOTAL  291 100% 175 100% 128 100% 
Table	4	presents	the	results	of	the	ordered	logit	regression	models	for	the	access	
to	resources;	we	constructed	to	test	our	hypothesis.	We	report	a	total	of	12	models	
to	 cover	 all	 the	 scenarios:	 three	 types	 of	 institutional	 partners	 and	 two	 types	 of	
resources,	 considering	 the	 compiled	 measurement	 for	 tie	 strength,	 and	 the	
unbundled	measurement	of	tie	strength	into	its	indicators.	
First,	 and	 before	 interpreting	 the	 results	 according	 to	 the	 aforementioned	
hypotheses,	 we	 would	 like	 to	 underline	 the	 lack	 of	 signification	 of	 the	 control	
variables	 addressing	 “formal	 collaborating	 activities”.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 models	
from	Table	4,	and	contrary	to	commonly	expected,	the	fact	of	collaborators	being	
engaged	 in	 research	 projects	 and	 elaboration	 of	 publication	 is	 not	 related	 in	 a	
significant	 and	 positive	 manner	 to	 the	 researchers’	 perception	 of	 accessing	 to	
reputation.	 These	 two	 collaboration	 activities—projects	 and	 publications—are	
certainly	 fundamental	 elements	 of	 enhancing	 academics’	 professional	 CVs	 and,	
thus	 their	 reputation	 as	 researchers.	 Also,	 unexpectedly	 research	 projects	 are	
significantly	related	to	the	access	to	funding.	
  
CHEPS Working Paper 06/2015 
 
24 
TABLE 4: Results of Ordered Logit Regressions on Reputation and Funding (Tangible Assets) Access 
Universities Governmental entities Firms 
REPUTATION FUNDING REPUTATION FUNDING REPUTATION FUNDING 
MOD 1 MOD 2 MOD 3 MOD 4 MOD 5 MOD 6 MOD 7 MOD 8 MOD 9 MOD 10 MOD 11 MOD 12 
Coef.  (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef.  (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error). Coef. (Error).
CONTROL                         
Research Type                         
Basic -0.17 (0.39) -0.19 (0.39) -0.48 (0.34) -0.42 (0.35) 0.09 (0.41) 0.17 (0.42) -0.42 (0.35) -0.27 (0.35) 1.26* (0.60) 1.13* (0.61) -0.85 (0.62) -0.69 (0.66)
Applied 0.12 (0.57) 0.30 (0.63) 0.93* (0.47) 1.03* (0.57) -1.14 (0.89) -1.11 (0.82) 0.42 (0.64) 0.53 (0.66) -0.80 (0.64) -0.64 (0.86) -0.84 (0.54) -1.05† (0.59)
Academic Rank                         
Professors -0.92† (0.53) -1.03† (0.51) -0.46 (0.40) -0.32 (0.42) -1.06 (0.65) -0.59 (0.71) -1.45** (0.50) -1.24* (0.55) -0.47 (0.77) -0.17 (0.90) 0.27 (0.67) 0.59 (0.73)
Associate Scientists & equivalent -0.90† (0.48) -0.93† (0.46) -0.56 (0.38) -0.43 (0.39) -1.20** (0.41) -1.14* (0.46) -1.10** (0.36) -1.13** (0.42) -0.14 (0.72) 0.12 (0.83) -0.27 (0.56) -0.19 (0.60)
Geographical location                         
Regional 0.03 (0.40) 0.12 (0.40) 0.00 (0.36) 0.07 (0.38) 0.21 (0.45) 0.44 (0.45) 0.49 (0.45) 0.65 (0.53) -1.21* (0.49) -1.09* (0.50) 0.20 (0.35) 0.29 (0.39)
International 0.13 (0.31) 0.12 (0.32) -0.36 (0.34) -0.41 (0.35) 0.55 (0.37) 0.62† (0.34) 0.58 (0.44) 0.67 (0.46) 0.33 (0.44) 0.34 (0.47) 0.07 (0.46) 0.18 (0.50)
Formal Collaboration Activities                         
Research Projects 0.24 (0.33) 0.27 (0.32) 0.51 (0.40) 0.51 (0.38) -0.22 (0.45) -0.37 (0.53) 0.02 (0.33) -0.07 (0.35) 0.33 (0.61) 0.50 (0.70) 0.61 (0.67) 0.73 (0.84)
Publications 0.34 (0.34) 0.36 (0.34) 0.05 (0.35) 0.01 (0.38) 0.12 (0.45) 0.02 (0.43) 0.06 (0.38) 0.13 (0.40) 0.15 (0.52) 0.39 (0.58) 0.36 (0.49) 0.37 (0.50)
Others -0.25 (0.36) -0.27 (0.35) 0.28 (0.40) 0.26 (0.39) 0.53 (0.44) 0.56 (0.45) 0.46 (0.40) 0.51 (0.39) 0.34 (0.43) 0.59 (0.49) -0.29 (0.40) -0.27 (0.41)
TIE STRENGTH 0.25** (0.05)   0.11* (0.04)   0.29** (0.06)   0.13** (0.04)   0.34** (0.07)   0.15† (0.08)   
Objective Indicators                         
Interaction Frequency   0.09 (0.13)   0.01 (0.16)   -0.02 (0.19)   0.06 (0.16)   0.47* (0.19)   0.44* (0.22)
Years in contact   0.29* (0.12)   -0.08 (0.13)   0.06 (0.18)   0.12 (0.15)   -0.21 (0.26)   0.04 (0.18)
Quasi-objective Indicators                         
Reciprocity Intensity   0.33 (0.22)   0.40* (0.18)   0.89* (0.35)   0.97** (0.25)   0.37 (0.27)   -0.11 (0.34)
Reciprocity Symmetry    1.07 (1.72)   2.92† (1.61)   5.25** (1.90)   1.11 (2.08)   3.13* (1.34)   1.45 (1.64)
Subjective Indicators                         
Friendship   0.40* (0.19)   0.14 (0.19)   0.41 (0.29)   -0.43† (0.24)   0.36 (0.26)   0.12 (0.30)
Trust   0.05 (0.20)   -0.01 (0.15)   0.24 (0.35)   0.15 (0.22)   0.50 (0.30)   0.28 (0.28)
# of observations (relationships) 291 291 291 291 175 175 175 175 128 128 128 128 
# of individuals (cluster)  129 129 129 129 97 97 97 97 68 68 68 68 
Log Pseudolikelihood -308.3 -306.3 -351.2 -344.6 -174.8 -162.8 -203.8 -196.3 -125.8 -118.8 -137.6 -134.2 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.09 
**p< 0.01. *p< 0.05. †p< 0.1 
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Table	5	presents	in	a	compiled	way	a	summary	of	the	hypotheses	and	results	from	Table	
4.	 It	shows	the	predicted	results	derive	by	the	hypotheses	(represented	with	a	+	sign)	
and	only	 the	significant	coefficients	addressing	 tie	strength	and	 its	 indicators	obtained	
through	 the	 regression	 models	 for	 each	 group	 of	 relationships	 and	 the	 two	 type	 of	
resources.		
TABLE 5: Summary Hypotheses and Results 
  University Government Firms 
  Reputation Funding  Reputation Funding  Reputation Funding 
HYPOTHESIS 1 TIE STRENGHT + + + + + + 
RESULTS 1 TIE STRENGHT 0.25** 0.11* 0.29** 0.13** 0.34** 0.15† 
 Model (Ordered Logit) 1 3 5 7 9 11 
  - INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE +  
HYPOTHESIS 2 
Objective Indicators       
Interaction Frequency     + + 
Years in contact     + + 
Quasi-objective Indicators       
Reciprocity Intensity   + +   
Reciprocity Symmetry   + +   
Subjective Indicators       
Friendship + +     
Trust + +     
RESULTS 2 
Objective Indicators       
Interaction Frequency     0.47* 0.44* 
Years in contact 0.29*      
Quasi-objective Indicators       
Reciprocity Intensity  0.40* 0.89* 0.97**   
Reciprocity Symmetry   5.25**  3.13*  
Subjective Indicators       
Friendship 0.40*      
Trust       
 Model (Ordered Logit) 2 4 6 8 10 12 
**p< 0.01. *p< 0.05 
Relationship	 2	 posited	 that	 the	 positive	 relationship	 between	 quasi‐objective	
characteristics	(or	reciprocity	indicators)	and	resources	access	is	greater	in	the	case	of	
governmental	partners,	than	more	distant	(firms)	or	closer	(universities)	collaborators.	
We	observed	in	table	5	that	in	the	access	to	funding	from	university	partners	reciprocity	
intensity	 is	 positive	 and	 significant.	 Moreover,	 reciprocity	 symmetry	 also	 shows	 a	
significant	coefficient	when	accessing	to	reputation	from	firms.	To	verify	relationship	2	
we	 need	 to	 apply	 an	 additional	 statistical	 technic	 for	 checking	 whether	 reciprocity	
coefficients	 from	 logistic	 models	 referring	 relationships	 with	 governmental	
collaborators	 are	 significantly	 greater	 than	 the	 rest.	 Table	 6	 shows	 the	 results	 of	
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applying	 bootstrapping	 on	 regression	 coefficients,	 revealing	 significant	 differences	 in	
the	 two	analysed	 cases;	 reciprocity	has	 a	 greater	 impact	 in	 the	 resources	 access	 from	
average	institutional	distant	partners.	
TABLE 6: Results of bootstrapping of reciprocity coefficients differences by collaborators type 
RESOURCE - Reciprocity Indicator 
Group of relationships 
Reciprocity coefficient 
differences by collaborator type 
Asymptotic significance 
(one-tailed) 
FUNDING - Reciprocity Intensity 
Government vs. University 
0.57 0.043* 
REPUTATION - Reciprocity Symmetry 
Government vs. Firms 
2.12 0.046* 
*p< 0.05 
Hypothesis	1	posited	that	strengthen	ties	is	a	good	strategy	to	promote	the	access	
to	 resources	 from	 collaborators	 independently	 their	 institutional	membership.	
Models	 1,	 3	 5,	 7,	 9	 and	 11	 verify	 such	 hypothesis.	With	 independency	 of	 the	 type	 of	
resource	 and	 the	 institutional	 context,	 the	 strength	 of	 ties	 is	 positively	 related	 to	 the	
access	to	these	resources.		
Hypothesis	2	posited	that	as	institutional	proximity	(distance)	increases	between	
R&D	 collaborators,	 academic	 scientists	 will	 tend	 to	 rely	 more	 on	 subjective	
(objective)	tie	characteristic	to	access	resources	from	their	collaborators.	We	can	
observe	 that	 for	 objective	 indicators	 of	 tie	 strength,	 interaction	 frequency	 is	 only	
positive	 and	 significant	 on	 resources	 access	 in	 the	 case	 of	 relationships	 with	 firms,	
which	 are	 undoubtedly	 the	 most	 institutional	 distant	 actors	 from	 the	 researchers.	
However,	years	in	contact	appears	not	to	be	a	significant	tie	characteristic	for	the	access	
to	any	resource,	except	for	the	acquisition	of	reputation	from	other	academic	colleagues	
(closer	 collaborators).	 Quasi‐objective	 indicators,	 represented	 by	 reciprocity	 are	
dominant	in	those	exchanges	carried	out	with	governmental	entities.	Results	reveal	that	
access	 to	 resources	 from	 this	 type	of	 collaborator	 is	 always	 related	 to	 reciprocity;	 the	
two	resources	analysed	rely	on	reciprocity	 intensity	and	reputation	also	on	symmetry.	
In	a	lesser	extent,	symmetrical	reciprocity	is	related	with	the	access	to	reputation	from	
firms,	and	reciprocity	 intensity	with	 the	access	 to	 funding	 from	universities.	However,	
bootstrapping	 technics	 show	 that	 reciprocity	 has	 a	 major	 effect	 on	 the	 access	 to	
resources	from	governmental	collaborators.	
Finally,	 it	 was	 expected	 to	 observe	 subjective	 indicators	 (friendship	 and	 trust)	 to	 be	
related	only	with	the	access	to	resources	from	close	institutional	partners.	Results	reveal	
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that	only	 friendship	plays	an	active	 role	on	resources	exchanges	 just	with	universities	
and	for	the	access	to	reputation.	The	access	to	funding	from	close	institutional	partners	
is	a	matter	of	reciprocity	intensity.	Remarkable,	trust	is	not	related	to	the	access	to	any	
of	the	analysed	resources	in	any	case.	
Results	also	show	that	the	tangible	and	intangible	nature	of	the	accessed	resource	may	
induce	 differentiated	 exchange	 behaviours.	 For	 example,	 the	 access	 to	 reputation	
presents	 a	 more	 complex	 exchange	 mode;	 we	 can	 observe	 in	 Table	 5	 that	 when	
acquiring	reputation	in	all	analysed	cases,	two	tie	strength	indicators	are	activated.	On	
the	 contrary,	 the	 access	 to	 funding	 relies	 on	 just	 one	 indicator.	 For	 close	 institutional	
collaborators,	 governmental	 entities	 and	 universities,	 accessing	 funding	 and	 other	
tangible	 resources	 is	a	matter	of	 reciprocity	 intensity.	That	 is	 to	 say,	exchanging	great	
amounts	of	reciprocal	services	(in	this	study,	personal	and	professional	advice)	favours	
the	shared	pool	of	tangible	resources	to	conduct	collaborative	research.		
7. Discussion	
Powell	 (1990)	explicitly	holds	 that	when	a	successful	 social	 relationship	perdures,	 the	
quality	 of	 resources	 accessed	 is	 valued	 more	 than	 the	 quantity.	 On	 the	 contrary,	
Granovetter	(1973)	claims	that	weak	ties	are	more	beneficial	to	actors	because	this	type	
of	 ties	 allows	 access	 to	 greater	 amounts	 of	 non‐redundant	 information.	 Applying	
Granovetter’s	idea	to	this	study,	if	the	development	of	science	relied	exclusively	on	the	
access	to	novel	information,	weak	ties	would	likely	be	more	critical.	Given	that	weak	ties	
need	 lower	 costs	 of	 maintenance,	 the	 network	 of	 an	 individual	 researcher	 could	 be	
constituted	by	a	 larger	number	of	contacts.	Consequently,	as	novel	 information	can	be	
transmitted	 through	weak	 ties	 without	major	 hindrances,	 then	 increased	 ties	 implies	
increased	information	quantity,	that	not	necessary	quality.	But	when	an	activity	requires	
greater	coordination	efforts	and	presents	greater	levels	of	uncertainty,	as	is	the	case	in	
many	scientific	endeavours,	then	interaction	frequency	and	reciprocity	–in	short,	strong	
ties–	 become	 more	 relevant	 in	 order	 to	 attain	 agents’	 goals	 (Hansen,	 1999).	 As	
Krackhardt	 eloquently	 states	 it:	 “change	 (here:	 scientific	 discovery)	 is	 the	 product	 of	
strong,	affective,	and	time‐honored	relationships”	(1992:238).	
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The	 potential	 benefits	 of	 establishing	 this	 type	 of	 link	 ‐access	 to	 dissimilar	 resources	
(ties	 with	 actors	 from	 other	 institutional	 circles)	 coupled	 with	 actual	 use	 of	 those	
resources	 (thanks	 to	 the	 achieved	 strength	 of	 the	 link)‐	 are	 fundamental.	 Resource	
achievement	is	thus	a	question	not	only	of	being	connected	to	sources	of	differentiated	
resources,	but	of	using	the	right	channel	to	access	these	sources.	Burt	(1992)	considers	
the	possibility	of	a	strong	tie	evolving	 into	a	bridge	as	rare.	However,	as	 the	results	of	
this	 study	 show,	 this	 situation	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	 exceptional	 one.	 Initially,	 it	 is	
unlikely	 researchers	 will	 form	 strong	 ties	 with	 actors	 with	 different	 institutional	
affiliation;	but	as	academics	progress	in	their	professional	career	and	the	relationships	
they	forge	with	actors	from	diverse	institutional	environments	coalesce,	the	existence	of	
strong	bridge‐ties	is	not	extraordinary.		
However,	as	Marsden	and	Campbell	 (1984)	also	 found,	and	as	 this	study	corroborates	
the	 relative	 importance	of	each	 tie‐strength	 indicator	 relies	on	 the	specific	 case	under	
study.	 For	 example,	 the	 study	 reveals	 that	 trust	 does	 not	 affect	 the	 access	 to	 tangible	
resources	 (i.e.,	 funding	 and	 tangible	 assets),	 which	 can	 be	 explicitly	 and	 formally	
protected	by	other	means.	In	the	context	of	scientific	research,	the	access	to	funding	is	
normally	formalized	through	agreements	and	contracts.	In	fact,	most	of	the	researchers’	
relationships,	 especially	 those	 with	 firms,	 are	 formalized	 through	 research	 project	
agreements	(see,	Table	3).	Therefore,	 in	the	case	of	exchange	of	 tangible	assets,	where	
the	 risk	 of	 opportunistic	 behaviour	 is	 lower	 –given	 that	 they	 can	 be	 quantified	 and	
protected	explicitly–	trust	becomes	irrelevant.		
The	 study	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 tie	 characteristic	 upon	 which	 the	 researchers	 base	
their	 access	 to	 resources	 varies	 depending	 on	 the	 institutional	 affiliation	 of	 their	
collaborators	 (see,	 Tables	 4‐5).	 The	 literature	 about	 social	 relationships	 assumes	 an	
evolution	 of	 relations	 as	 they	 consolidate	 over	 time.	 The	 strengthening	 of	 relations	 is	
normally	 reflected	 by	 the	 development	 of	 the	 tie‐strength	 indicators	 (Bouty,	 2000;	
Coleman,	 1990;	 Granovetter,	 1973;	 Homans,	 1950;	 McFadyen	 &	 Cannella	 Jr,	 2004;	
Putnam,	1993;	Racine,	1999;	Uzzi,	1996,	1997).	However,	these	studies	do	not	include	in	
their	analyses	actors’	institutional	affiliations,	nor	the	underlying	dynamics	of	the	access	
to	 resources	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 tie	 strength.	 Our	 study	 shows	 that	 relationships	 between	
researchers	and	firms	are,	in	general	terms,	more	recent	and	less	developed	than	those	
with	governmental	 entities.	This	 stage	of	early	development	 is	 characterized	by	 lower	
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levels	 of	 trust,	 friendship	 and	 reciprocity	 within	 the	 relationship	 (see,	 Table	 2).	
Therefore,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 this	 lesser	 development	 of	 the	 qualitative	 characteristics	 of	
these	ties	influences	researchers’	perception	of	resource	acquisition	in	a	way	that	they	
only	perceive	access	as	the	interaction	with	firms	is	being	realized.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 relationships	with	 nearer	 actors,	 the	 results	 confirm	 that	 the	 access	 to	
resources	is	in	most	of	the	cases	reciprocity‐based.	Actors	institutionally	close	involved	
in	R&D	collaborations	may	find	relatively	easier	to	achieve	coincidental	valuations	about	
the	 resources	 they	 exchange.	 For	 this	 reason	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 they	 systematically	 base	
their	exchange	on	reciprocity,	which	in	certain	sense	we	could	affirm	that	constitutes	the	
more	 efficient	 and	 equilibrated	mode	 of	 exchange	within	 instrumental	 relations	 (give	
and	 receive	 tends	 to	 equals	 between	 partners).	 The	 beauty	 of	 reciprocity,	 as	 Komter	
(2007)	 nicely	 stated,	 is	 that	 combines	 dichotomies	 within	 the	 same	 behaviour:	
generosity	and	self‐interest,	altruism	and	egoism,	or	freedom	and	obligation,	which	are	
not	mutually	exclusive,	but	rather	coexist.		
At	the	micro	level,	this	study	has	demonstrated	that	any	intent	of	insight	on	the	logics	of	
exchange	 among	 R&D	 collaborators	 needs	 to	 consider	 jointly	 all	 three	 fundamental	
elements	 that	 constitute	 social	 relationships:	 nodes,	 ties	 and	 resources	 flows.	 For	
example,	 in	 this	 study	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 that	 collaborators’	 individual	 and	 shared	
behaviours	 are	 being	 affected	 by	 their	 own	 and	 their	 partners’	 institutional	 contexts	
framing	 the	 relationship	 (nodes	 characteristic),	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 formed	 linkages	
between	 partners	 (tie	 strength	 and	 its	 indicators)	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 exchanged	
resources	(feature	of	the	resources	flow).	Together	all	these	elements	has	the	potential	
to	provide	with	a	deep	understanding	of	R&D	collaborative	relationships.		
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9. Annexes	
TABLE 6: Correlation Coefficientsa  
TOTAL 
(N=594) Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Funding / Other tangible assets Access         
2. Reputation Access 0.361**        
3. Tie strength 0.137** 0.310**       
4. Interaction Frequency 0.158** 0.180** 0.430**      
5. Years in contact 0.006 0.155** 0.497** 0.076*     
6. Reciprocity Intensity 0.189** 0.309** 0.598** 0.258** 0.236**    
7. Reciprocity Symmetry (RS-nor) 0.046 0.104** 0.025 0.037 0.013 0.076*   
8. Friendship 0.124** 0.322** 0.732** 0.271** 0.352** 0.509** 0.037  
9. Trust 0.139** 0.303** 0.631** 0.232** 0.247** 0.415* 0.007 0.557** 
FIRMS 
(N=128) Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Funding / Other tangible assets Access         
2. Reputation Access 0.299**        
3. Tie strength 0.207** 0.310**       
4. Interaction Frequency 0.216** 0.175* 0.300**      
5. Years in contact 0.101 0.094 0.377** -0.085     
6. Reciprocity Intensity 0.088 0.278** 0.585** 0.085 0.171*    
7. Reciprocity Symmetry (RS-nor) 0.076 0.144† -0.008 0.088 0.031 -0.007   
8. Friendship 0.179* 0.308** 0.688** 0.138† 0.220** 0.477** 0.034  
9. Trust 0.176* 0.308** 0.615** 0.108 0.188* 0.374** -0.029 0.533** 
GOV 
(N=175) Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Funding / Other tangible assets Access         
2. Reputation Access 0.374**        
3. Tie strength 0.157** 0.331**       
4. Interaction Frequency 0.172** 0.210** 0.494**      
5. Years in contact 0.021 0.145* 0.530** 0.098     
6. Reciprocity Intensity 0.301** 0.399** 0.621** 0.411** 0.206**    
7. Reciprocity Symmetry (RS-nor) 0.027 0.141* -0.029 -0.061 -0.070 0.063   
8. Friendship 0.113† 0.370** 0.740** 0.336** 0.404** 0.560** 0.009  
9. Trust 0.157* 0.332** 0.606** 0.290** 0.292** 0.450** -0.044 0.572** 
UNI 
(N=291) Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Funding / Other tangible assets Access         
2. Reputation Access 0.409**        
3. Tie strength 0.140** 0.276**       
4. Interaction Frequency 0.129** 0.161** 0.465**      
5. Years in contact -0.010 0.157** 0.493** 0.125*     
6. Reciprocity Intensity 0.193** 0.244** 0.570** 0.240** 0.239**    
7. Reciprocity Symmetry (RS-nor) 0.072 0.037 0.029 0.069 0.014 0.092†   
8. Friendship 0.150** 0.283** 0.727** 0.295** 0.323** 0.477** 0.004  
9. Trust 0.150** 0.265** 0.600** 0.253** 0.207** 0.382** 0.028 0.583** 
aNon-parametric Kendall’s tau_b correlation coefficients 
**p< 0.01. *p< 0.05. †p< 0.1 
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